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BANEZ’S BIG PROBLEM: THE GROUND OF FREEDOM
James Dominic Rooney, OP

While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of
grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that
position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e.,
Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how
the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt
to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed
by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even if it were true that freedom does not
require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem.

While many contemporary philosophers of religion are familiar with the
reconciliation of grace and freedom proposed by Luis de Molina (i.e.,
Molinism), fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed
by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism).1 Both
share a 400-year-long and heavily fraught, complicated, intricate history.
To avoid complexities of historical interpretation, I will broadly construe
these positions in terms of occupying a certain logical space. The domain
of this space results from a difficulty caused by the fact that Catholic theology accepts two sets of apparently conflicting claims about human freedom. On the one hand, the tradition affirms that human beings cannot
perform a special subset of actions—call them “supernatural actions”—
without God’s special causal help:
If anyone affirms that without the illumination and the inspiration of the
Holy Spirit . . . through the strength of nature he can think anything good
which pertains to the salvation of eternal life, as he should, or choose, or
consent to salvation, that is to the evangelical proclamation, he is deceived
1
This ignorance of the Banezian position was noted by Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., “Thomist
Premotion and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion,” 607–32. However, there is a slew of
recent work on the topic, defending the broadly Thomistic/Banezian position on grace and
freedom, even if a revisionary version. David Torrijos-Castrillejo compiled an extensive list
of such defenders in his recent “Was Báñez a Bañecian?” 431n1. Many of these defenses,
however, end up defending the Garrigou-Lagrange version that I criticize here. By contrast,
see Mark Spencer, “Divine Causality and Created Freedom,” 919–963.
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by the heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God speaking in the
Gospel.2

On the other hand, a strong affirmation of freedom was formulated by the
Catholic Church in opposition to versions of Calvinism or other theological traditions, holding instead that human beings have the freedom to
resist or cooperate with God’s grace, even when acting under that grace.
Famously, a view attributed to the Catholic theologian Cornelius Jansen
was deemed heretical because his writings were taken to deny the power
of the will to resist or obey grace; there are many such examples.3
Considering the space of possible orthodox accounts of how these
claims are compatible, two options developed among Catholic theologians. On the Molinist option, one opts to say that God foreknows how
humans will respond to grace in virtue of knowing counterfactual propositions about what that person would freely choose to do in non-actual situations (i.e., counterfactuals of freedom). Then, God acts upon a
creature4 in order to bring about their conversion, for example, by giving those helps (i.e., grace) that He can infallibly know will bring about
their conversion; and the same goes for God bringing a person to perform
any other supernatural act. As God’s grace brings about what a creature
would themselves freely choose, the Molinist proposes, the apparently
conflicting truths about human freedom and God’s grace are reconciled.
The other option is Banezianism. Banezians broadly hold that God’s
grace is intrinsically such that it brings about human free decisions, using
technical terminology (viz., “physical premotion”) to indicate that God’s
grace is causally efficacious in achieving these results. They would contrast
their position to the Molinist, claiming that Molinism holds that God’s
grace brings about supernatural acts, such as conversion, only in virtue of
being “extrinsically” efficacious. This is to say that the grace God gives is
not, by itself, causally efficacious in bringing about some such result. The
Banezian, however, holds that God’s causal determination can directly
bring about human free action without undermining their freedom. God’s
manner of causing an action is not the same sort usually envisioned in
philosophical debates about compatibilism, however, in which one typically thinks of a case where the initial state of the universe and fixed
laws of nature casually determine one unique physical future. Instead,
Heinrich Denzinger, Peter Hünermann, et al., eds. Sources of Catholic Dogma.
Denzinger, Sources of Catholic Dogma, n. 1093 [Condemned proposition of Jansen]: “The
Semipelagians admitted the necessity of a prevenient interior grace for each act, even for the
beginning of faith; and in this they were heretics, because they wished this grace to be such
that the human will could either resist or obey.” But there are many such parallel dogmatic
claims: e.g., in the same decree against Jansen, the proposition is condemned as heretical:
“In the state of fallen nature one never resists interior grace”; see further Denzinger, n. 814,
n. 797, n. 1363.
4
In this paper, my examples are concerned with human persons, but it is generally understood that these claims are also applicable to any free creature, e.g., angelic persons as well as
human persons. I use “creature” to indefinitely refer to any such free person.
2
3
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the Banezian argues, God can directly bring about properly free acts in
His creatures, without necessitating or making those actions any less free,
because God has unique causal powers that nothing else has.5
Whereas a typical and prominent grounding problem for Molinism
involves how there can be counterfactual truths about freedom, and what
grounds those truths, a typical problem for the Banezian position is that
the view certainly looks like some version of theological compatibilism.
It is uncontroversial that the Banezian is committed to a strong concept
of creaturely freedom, as that is a doctrinal commitment of Catholicism,
but the aforementioned doctrinal condemnations were controversial texts
in the disputes between Molinists and Banezians. On the one hand, it
is not uncontroversial that, for the Banezian, creatures can resist God’s
grace. Molinists therefore appealed to such condemnations to argue that
Banezianism was heretical. On the other hand, I refrain from saying that
the Church requires incompatiblism to be true, because there is great
debate whether Thomas Aquinas’s own theory of grace or the interpretative tradition that I am calling Banezianism is correctly characterized as
libertarian or compatibilist.6 Some Banezians straightforwardly bite the
bullet of theological compatibilism.7
For my purposes, it is unimportant to distinguish whether Aquinas or
Banez is truly a compatibilist. While many are familiar with the aforementioned grounding problem for Molinism, what this paper argues is that
Banezianism’s central problem is an analogate of the grounding problem
for Molinism.8 The Banezian has the burden of explaining that in virtue of
which it is true that a creature can do otherwise (e.g., resist God’s efficacious grace), much like the Molinist has a burden of showing what it is in
virtue of which counterfactuals of freedom are true. My aim is to clarify
this problem for the Banezian position generally and broadly. Moreover,
this problem, as I will pose it in the context of one recent and prominent
version of Banezianism, is unaffected by biting the bullet of theological
compatibilism.
Consider, for example, that—for the Banezian of the sort like GarrigouLagrange below—God is giving intrinsically different graces to people
who cooperate with grace (such as a person who makes an act of faith and
love in God) and those who do not (e.g., a person who remains impenitent until death). A serious consequence of this view is that a person who
See Spencer, “Divine Causality and Created Freedom,” 924–925.
For example: Brian Shanley, “Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism”; Thomas
J. Loughran, “Aquinas, Compatibilist”; Scott MacDonald, “Aquinas’s Libertarian Account
of Free Choice.”
7
C.f., Steven Long, Natura Pura, esp. 3, 38–41.
8
See Thomas Flint, Divine Providence, esp. 123. There is a significant literature on the
“grounding objection” to Molinism. For some of the dialectic: William Lane Craig, “Middle
Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection’”; Steven B. Cowan, “The
Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited”; Scott A. Davison, “Craig on the
Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge.”
5
6
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sins has, by that very fact, not received the same kind of grace as a righteous
person who does not sin. Given that the Banezian holds that God’s grace
precedes creaturely free choice, God cannot be responding to human
decisions (even counterfactually) in deciding who receives the efficacious
graces and who does not. Instead, Banezians are clear that God chooses
to give, or not give, efficacious grace to an individual, from eternity, and
before knowing anything about what such a person would do. Yet, on the
supposition that God were to choose not to give efficacious grace to a person, there is no possible world where that person can avoid sinning and,
if God never chooses to give that person efficacious grace, going to hell.
While one might naturally wonder about theodicy on a view where
God denies some people the aid needed to save them from hell, the big
problem for the Banezian is ultimately one of coherence. The grounding
problem for their view only requires certain claims about the power or
ability to do otherwise to get off the ground, and those claims are mandated by Catholic doctrine and accepted by the Banezian. The Banezian
needs to account for how it is possible that a creature can do otherwise
in the special case when God moves the creature to act through grace.
Specifically, what grounds the truth of the claim that, even when God
determines human free choices from eternity such that a human being
has only one course of action open to them, those human beings are morally responsible for their actions?9 If the Banezian view entails that human
beings, acting under grace, strictly lack any ability to do otherwise, then
the view is incoherent.
I am characterizing the “ability to do otherwise” in a very broad way
because the most prominent strategy for the Banezian involves affirming
that humans have an ability to do otherwise, even under the influence
of God’s efficacious grace, but that this ability to do otherwise does not
involve having alternative possibilities; this strategy was (in)famously
endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.10 I will take Taylor O’Neil’s
recent Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin as an exemplar of
this line of argument, what I’ll term the “Garrigou Manoeuvre.” The
Manoeuvre is presented within the context of a theodicy, aiming to vindicate God from being the author of sin while presenting a certain picture of
how God causes our free acts under grace.11 But the theodicy is not central
to my concerns. What I show is that, even if it were true that freedom does
not require alternative possibilities, the Garrigou Manoeuvre is incoherent. Surprisingly, the Manoeuvre is only successful if Molinism were true.
9
For example, Long himself accepts that a human being retains a conditional ability to
resist grace, even though one never actually would do so; see his “St. Thomas Aquinas,
Divine Causality, and the Mystery of Predestination,” 66.
10
This explanation as to why Banezianism does not entail compatibilism is primarily
found in Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s two works on the subject, Grace and Predestination,
but he is largely presenting and expanding on the work of other Thomists, including notably
Carolus Renatus Billuart and Joanne Baptista Gonet.
11
Taylor Patrick O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin.
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The Garrigou Manoeuvre cannot account for the ability of the creature to
avoid sin (or resist grace) unless it helps itself implicitly to Molinist counterfactuals of freedom. If Banezianism is to successfully overcome its own
version of the grounding problem, the Garrigou Manoeuvre is not the way
to do so. I will conclude by suggesting that Banezianism need not be compatibilist, and that the versions of Banezianism that are not compatibilist
will be able to resolve this grounding problem.
The Garrigou Manoeuvre
O’Neil sets out to defend the coherence of the Banezian position, which
holds that God exercises a real causal influence on the human will through
giving them grace, moving them to enter into union with Himself, even
though human beings remain free in some strong sense compatible with
Catholic dogma on the question. God acts causally to move someone to
enter into union with Himself, but this encompasses more than just the
initial act of having faith in and loving God that is called justification;
indeed, for the Banezian, God must give the help of His grace at any time
a created person does anything supernaturally meritorious, where that is
some good act not possible merely given the natural powers of the creature’s will.12 At times, however, it is easier to focus on the initial justification, and so I will often more simply refer merely to cases of free created
persons entering into union with God.
The Banezian, further, requires a distinction between two ways God
operates on human beings. What they call “efficacious” grace is that causal
help from God in virtue of which I actually do something supernaturally
meritorious.13 This technical language of “in virtue of which” is intended
to mirror the Banezian claim that, even though I always act if God so causes
me to act, God does not thereby render my actions necessary, i.e., necessitate my acts.14 When God gives me only power to do such a good action,
such that it is within my free control to cooperate with God’s offer to enter
into union with Him or reject His offer, that is instead “sufficient” grace.
Given that doing something supernaturally meritorious is conceived by
the Banezian as activating a power, every time one is given an efficacious
Clearly, everyone on the Banezian side agrees that God is causally involved in producing every creaturely act. But I do not address the question here of whether God needs
to move the will immediately to do something naturally good, and I bracket how to further differentiate supernatural from natural good acts. The tradition had numerous ways of
resolving the question, but it is not important for my purposes here. In another paper, I have
defended the position that God does not immediately cause a special premotion for every
natural act of a human being, and that He does so only for each supernatural act, but I cannot
give my argument for that position here; see my “Why All Classical Theists Should Believe
in Physical Premotions, But It Doesn’t Really Matter (For Freedom).”
13
This definition of efficacious grace is clearly from a Banezian point of view, and I’m not
presuming that the Molinist characterization of efficacious grace would be incoherent.
14
W. Matthews Grant argues that this is compatible with libertarian claims about freedom,
“Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Free Acts are Caused by God?”; “Aquinas on How God
Causes the Act of Sin without Causing Sin Itself.” See also Robert Koons, “Dual Agency.”
12
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grace to act, one is also being given or has been previously given by God
the sufficient power (i.e., sufficient grace) to act. These distinctions were
all attributed to Thomas Aquinas, as the foremost defenders of the theory
claimed to be offering interpretations of Aquinas’s texts on grace and predestination, but it is unimportant for my purposes whether they were correct in doing so.15 Similarly, while the Banezian camp admits of dissenting
voices and many historical twists and turns in defining these terms, I will
bracket these and focus on Garrigou-Lagrange’s own formulation of the
position, as his is the target of my criticisms.
The Banezian theory has been attacked on multiple fronts, not limited
to attacks on its metaphysical assumptions about the nature of God’s
causality and human free choice.16 A famous debate occurred historically
on this question, the De Auxiliis controversy from 1580–1607, with the
aforementioned Molinist and Banezian positions as what dominated the
discussions.17 O’Neil also criticizes the works of other Thomists, such as
Francisco Marin-Sola, Jacques Maritain, Jean-Herve Nicholas, and Bernard
Lonergan, who each attempted in the last century to revise the metaphysics or other elements of the classical Banezian theory. I will not defend
or discuss any of these other versions of Banezianism, but rather focus
on O’Neil’s defense of Garrigou-Lagrange’s version. In particular, I am
not concerned with the metaphysics or details of Garrigou-Lagrange’s
account of how predestination occurs, which are highly technical. Instead,
I am interested in the way that Garrigou-Lagrange responds to worries that
his theory seems to entail that humans cannot avoid committing sin, if
God chooses not to grant them efficacious grace, and O’Neil’s defense of
his responses. This strategy for defending Banezianism is what I am calling the Garrigou Manoeuvre.
First, the objection and the account. Garrigou-Lagrange took himself
to be doing nothing more than working out the implications of the traditional Banezian account of grace and predestination. The primary question for the Banezian in general, as for Garrigou-Lagrange in particular, is
this: in virtue of what does God give, or not give, some free person efficacious grace? The Banezian cannot say that there are truths about what the
person would do, as the Molinist can, and thus (for example) cannot claim
that God would move someone to supernatural action only if He knew
that they would freely consent to it. This is so, according to Banezianism,
because there are no truths about what a created person would do apart
from God’s choices about whether to give that person the requisite efficacious grace or not. Creaturely freedom is a product of God’s causal activity,
not something independent of it. Conversely, if there is nothing in virtue of
O’Neil gives a clear overview of the evidence that Aquinas held the central Banezian
claims in Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 13–67.
16
Perhaps to be mentioned in connection with the metaphysics was Bernard Lonergan’s
work that took to task the Banezian interpretation of the relation between a causal power and
its manifestation. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom.
17
O’Neil Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 1–2.
15
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which God gives efficacious grace to people—if God does so at His own
good pleasure—then it seems like God would be arbitrary (and probably
even unjust18). Thus, the natural question for the Banezian is how there
can be something in control of the free creature that makes God responsive
to them, but which is not independent of God’s causal activity. GarrigouLagrange claims that there is something in virtue of which God denies
someone efficacious grace, and that this is in the control of the sinner: a
person “is deprived of efficacious grace because by sinning he resists sufficient grace . . . [Therefore,] God refuses efficacious grace only to one who
resists sufficient grace; otherwise there would be an injustice involved.”19
But Garrigou-Lagrange also endorses claims that seem to make his
explanation circular. On the one hand, his metaphysics requires that any
act that would precede God’s giving efficacious grace would require God’s
efficacious grace to perform. Thus, he would rule out the idea that someone could prepare themselves, by some prayer or other interior act, to ask
God to give them efficacious grace, without already (by the very fact of
doing this preceding action!) having been given that grace. Further, while
he claims that “man does not sin on account of insufficient help or any
divine neglect, but because of his own deficiency,”20 Garrigou-Lagrange
also claims that everyone always is deficient and resists God through sin,
apart from efficacious grace.21 If God chooses not to give me efficacious
grace, then it is impossible that I ever act in a way that does not resist
God’s offer of entering into union with me (i.e., sufficient grace). But then
it seems that, if God decides to not give someone efficacious grace, and
that person can do nothing independent of and prior to God’s decisions
to cause or impede God from giving that grace, the vindication GarrigouLagrange offers is apparently viciously circular: God denied me efficacious grace because I resisted sufficient grace, but I resisted sufficient
grace in virtue of God’s withholding efficacious grace from me.
Garrigou-Lagrange attempts to address this apparent circularity in two
ways. One strategy involves interpreting this “in virtue of” clause as mere
permission rather than causal interference (and I will take this to be the
central, explanatory move). However, O’Neil focuses on another strategy
that involves what Garrigou-Lagrange calls the “principle of predilection”: “no man would be better than another if he were not loved more by
God.”22 On this second strategy, the Garrigou Manoeuvre ends in saying
that why some receive efficacious grace and others do not ultimately rests
only on God’s loving some people more than others—there is no further
explanation.

He would be unjust, we might think, because God sends people to eternal torment and
punishes them for eternity merely on a whim.
19
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 223.
20
Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 260.
21
O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 124–125.
22
O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 130.
18
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O’Neil tries to dispel the feeling of unease with the Garrigou Manoeuvre,
first, by arguing that while it is particularly true of “any variants of the
Dominican Thomistic treatment that posit the principle of predilection . . .
[that these] cannot escape the inherent mystery of why God chooses one
rather than another,”23 the problem is also true of any view which holds
that God elects some to glory by His free graciousness. All such are committed to the mysterious consequence that “It is well within God’s power
to move each man to his supernatural end infallibly, and yet he does not do
so[.]”24 For example, even on Molinism, there is the mystery why God permitted Judas to exist in circumstances where God knew that Judas would
inevitably sin, despite God being able to put Judas in circumstances where
Judas would not have sinned (and knowing that there were such circumstances, viz. His middle knowledge).
a. Dissecting the Manoeuvre
One does not need to reject the underlying Thomistic metaphysics that
God is the source of all goodness to find that second strategy for resolving
the circularity in Garrigou-Lagrange’s explanation of grace unsatisfying.
Here I object not so much from intuitions about God’s justice, but rather
because the principle of predilection is ultimately satisfactory if and only
if the first of Garrigou-Lagrange’s strategies for resolving the account’s
circularity is coherent. That is, what the Garrigou Manoeuvre needs to
account for is what makes it the case that the creature has a power to cooperate with or resist God’s grace, even if it has no alternative possibilities.
Only then does it make sense to say that, if the creature has such a power,
God’s love of some creatures more than others does not undermine their
moral responsibility. Naturally, Garrigou-Lagrange has an answer to this
question (which involves appeal to a power). But, first, we need to clearly
state that the principle of predilection is a distraction from what is explanatorily central.
To see this, consider that O’Neil is arguing is that God is under no obligation to save everyone. This can be granted without conceding that it would
be acceptable for God to place creatures in circumstances where, independent of their free choices, they are unable to avoid sinning. The central question, then, is: in virtue of what are humans responsible for their actions, if
God so restricts (from eternity) the course of actions open to them, so that
some lack any alternative possibilities for acting otherwise? This is particularly pressing in the case of God denying efficacious grace to a person,
where that person (as a consequence) in no possible world can avoid sinning. O’Neil’s response is that God’s reprobation, His permission for someone to go to hell, is a non-act on God’s part. Rather than exerting a “positive
influence, or a causal exclusion” that makes one unable to do a good act,
God’s permission of sin is “a non-act, a nothing, a not-giving of something
23
24

O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 278.
O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 278.
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gratuitous, that is, upholding the creature from rejecting God and dying in
such a state [of mortal sin].”25 Consequently, O’Neil concludes, God is not
responsible for causing the sinner to go to hell.
However, the fact that God’s permission is not a “positive act” would
not by itself be sufficient to show that He is not responsible for the sinner’s
sin. My failing to save a drowning child from the well is a non-act, but one
in which I am morally culpable for my non-action—technically, a “sin of
omission.” We must be careful about framing such a worry, however, as
such sins of omission require that I have failed to fulfill a moral duty. For
some Thomists (such as Brian Davies), God has no moral duties or obligations toward His creation.26 It is possible to put to one side this controversial claim about God’s lack of moral obligations, however, as the worry
can be put without appeal to any of God’s moral obligations. O’Neil’s
defense requires a stronger claim: that God giving a creature the possibility not to sin is gratuitous, so that God can still hold a creature responsible
for their sins even though they lacked any alternative possibilities that
were not sinful. But we still have to disambiguate this claim. The claim
could be, either, that creatures are themselves responsible for being in the
situations where they lack non-sinful alternatives (God is not responsible
for the actions of creatures in these situations, and His grace saves them
from themselves). Or, alternatively, we might say that I am free even when
I lack alternative possibilities for action, as long as the possibilities that
I do have open to me are relevantly in my control.
The question of alternative possibilities is controversial, as I will explain
below, but we need to step back for a moment. Recall that, on Molinism,
the truths about what I would do in certain counterfactual situations are
true in virtue of something independent of God’s choices (whether God’s
essence or my essence). For example, the Molinist thinks it is a fact that
Peter would repent of betraying His Lord if Peter was put in exactly the
circumstances the apostle Peter historically occupied, but that God knows
of other circumstances in which Peter would not have repented. This is
a metaphysical fact independent of God’s choice to create Peter—even if
Peter never existed, God would still know what Peter would have done
when the cock crowed thrice. For Banezianism, by contrast, truths about
what I do are all true in virtue of God’s choices about me. For example,
Peter’s decisions are known by God because all those actions are present to God in His eternal perspective on time.27 God did not create Peter
so that Peter would inevitably repent of his betrayal by internal necessity. Instead, in the same logical moment that God chose to create Peter,
God can be imagined to thereby have chosen to create all of Peter’s other
actions because, even though Peter comes to exist and act at definite points
in time, those acts are all present to God in eternity. If God never created
O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 281.
Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, 60.
27
See Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity.”
25
26
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Peter, there would be no actions of Peter for God to “see” from eternity
and no truths about whether Peter would betray Christ. For this reason,
the Banezian would deny that there are counterfactuals of freedom for my
actions that are independent of God’s will.
Even more strongly, though, the Banezian claims that God’s choices
about whether to give efficacious grace will make true whether a person
acts a certain way (e.g., whether Peter repents of his betrayal). This is the
claim, central to the theory, that God’s grace is intrinsically efficacious.
There are therefore no truths about whether a person would or would not
cooperate with God’s grace independent or prior to God’s decision to give
or withhold that grace—all the truths about Peter repenting, or not, are
made true by God’s decisions to give Peter grace or not.
I am here using the phrase “independent of and prior to,” and its correlative “subsequent to,” in a loose manner to indicate a logical (not temporal) order in God’s choices or intentions. My decision to get my car keys,
for example, is logically subsequent as well as temporally subsequent to
my decision to go for a drive. For God, of course, there are no temporal
“befores” or “afters” in His decision making, just as there are presumably
no separate acts of decision. Nevertheless, there is a logical order: God’s
decision to create Adam’s human heart would be a decision that is logically posterior to His decision to create Adam, a human being, because
(we can imagine) God created the heart to serve a particular function in
Adam’s human body. His decision to create that heart in Adam’s case was
not “independent of” His decision to create a human being. By contrast,
we might imagine that His decision to create human beings was prior to
and independent of His decision to become incarnate as a human being.28
Nevertheless, the Banezian claims that my actions are not simply necessitated by God. A classical distinction was drawn between what I actually
do under influence of God’s grace, where I necessarily only can perform one act, and what I nevertheless could have done at that very same
moment, such that I could have done otherwise than what I actually did
(viz. the sensus compositus/divisus).29 For the Manoeuvre to work, too, it
28
According to Aquinas, God would not have become incarnate (or we can’t know
whether He
would have done so) if original sin had never occurred; c.f., Summa Theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3.
29
A distinction between two senses of possibility, the sensus compositus/sensus divisus, was
significant in the historical Banezian/Molinism debates, with Banez giving a complicated
account of alternative possibilities on the basis of this distinction. In short, the view was
that a person only can, in fact, act in one determinate way (choosing A or B but not both
at the same time), and this was the (composite) sense in which, if God grants efficacious
grace to a person, they only actually cooperate with God. But the Banezian argued that in a
different (viz. the divided) sense, even at that moment when they actually cooperated with
God’s grace, that person could have done otherwise. It is helpful to point out that John Duns
Scotus also analyzes freedom with appeal to a similar distinction, as explained in detail by
Jean-Pascal Anfray, “Molina and John Duns Scotus,” esp. 330–353. Further, such a distinction
has further been defended by contemporary philosophers as well. See, for example, Michael
Rota, “Synchronic Contingency and the Problem of Freedom and Foreknowledge.”
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cannot be the case that creatures are responsible for being in the situations
where they lack non-sinful alternatives. Instead, God’s permission of sin,
or decision to give efficacious grace, is what puts the creature in the modal
neighborhood where they have (respectively) the possibilities that they
do. The decision to permit a creature to sin is made from eternity, not as
“foreseeing” what a creature does in time or what the creature would do
in a counterfactual situation, but as inevitably restricting that creature’s
alternative possibilities, even if it is a non-act. If the Garrigou Manoeuvre
works, then, it does so only because God’s choice to restrict a creature’s
alternative possibilities in this way does not undermine that creature’s
moral responsibility.
The central claim of the Garrigou Manoeuvre, then, is something like
this: that it is sufficient for my being free that I have the relevant capacities
for free action, even if I never actualize them to choose an action that is
not sinful. The story of how I sin, then, is this one: all God does is know
that I inevitably will commit sin without His help (perhaps in all nearby
modal worlds). He is under no obligation to save me from myself, and so
Him leaving me without efficacious grace does not make Him responsible
for my sins. God does not take away or impede my normally-functioning
capacities for choice when I sin. To the contrary, when I sin, I act fully from
my own capacities and volitions; God has only refrained from miraculously
intervening in those normal processes in such a way as to stop me from
doing what I want to do. And that, surely, cannot be something prejudicial
to my freedom. Similarly, God is not responsible for what I do, even if He
decides from eternity that He will not miraculously intervene to save me
from myself.
On my rendering, then, we can state the Manoeuvre in a way that does
not require any position on whether alternative possibilities are necessary
for freedom. And this is pace the infelicitous claims sometimes made by
O’Neil and Garrigou-Lagrange. They sometimes reason that, if it were
truly impossible for me to act in such a way as to avoid sinning, I would
not be responsible for these sinful actions because I would lack the relevant alternative possibilities. For example, if God were to make it such that
I could not do what the moral law commands, then O’Neil concedes that
“it would do away with the real possibility for me to uphold the divine
laws of God. God would command something that was impossible.”30 As
I will show, this is not quite the right way to put the matter.
Nevertheless, there is a serious problem with the Garrigou Manoeuvre
even on this rendering—and without appeal to the way that God’s efficacious grace seems to cut off alternative possibilities—it is the case that
the Garrigou Manoeuvre is incoherent. Simply put, I will argue that the
Manoeuvre works only if Molinism is true. But, by stipulation of the
Manoeuvre, Molinism is false. If there are no counterfactuals of freedom,
as the Manoeuvre claims, then the Manoeuvre cannot appeal to such
30

O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 282.
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counterfactuals—yet, in fact, it does appeal to counterfactuals of freedom.
This problem for the Manoeuvre is fatal.
b. The Problem with the Manoeuvre’s Story of Sin
The Manoeuvre’s story of sin, as I’ve given it earlier, relied on an intuition
that God leaving me without efficacious grace does not make Him responsible for my sins, because God does not take away or impede my normally-functioning capacities for choice when He does so. What I do without
His grace are my acts, even if there is no world where I use my capacities
well. God doesn’t need to save me from myself, although He certainly can.
But the story requires an assumption, namely that there are truths about
what my capacities permit me to do, independent of or prior to whether
God has decided to give me efficacious grace or not. This is not to say that
I can do things absent the divine motion, which all Banezians deny, but
that there are truths about my capacities, prior to and independent of God’s
efficacious grace. These facts about my capacities are what are supposed
to explain why it is true that I could have done otherwise even at the very
moment that God is causing me to perform some particular action.31
The assumption would be unhelpful if it only concerned natural capcities. But it is employed in a Molinist sense if we understand those capacities (as Garrigou-Lagrange does) to include sufficient grace. This makes a
significant difference because, for the Garrigou Manoeuvre to preserve the
responsibility of creatures for their sins, there have to be counterfactuals
of freedom that God knows independently of His decision to create that
creature and to give them efficacious grace. But, if Banezianism is true,
there are no such truths. Instead, the truths about whether I cooperate
with God’s grace are all made true by God’s decision to give me efficacious grace. Consequently, God’s decision to permit me to sin, to not give
me efficacious grace, would be what makes it true that I have no possibilities for non-sinful action. If the assumption is not read as Molinist, the
Banezian will have a serious grounding problem such that the view is
incoherent.
Let’s step back for a moment to disambiguate the assumption from
other nearby claims. There is a claim that plausibly follows from the
Christian doctrine of original sin: for any human being that exists postFall, that human being will inevitably act sinfully at some time if God
does not intervene.32 Further, as we already saw in setting up the problem of grace and freedom, the Catholic tradition requires the following
claim: a human being cannot do any supernaturally good act unless God
intervenes to assist in production of that act.33 One could imagine that the
31
This is to say, in other words, that these claims about capacities are supposed to ground
the truth of the assertions that I could do otherwise in the divided sense (i.e., at the moment
I am acting under efficacious grace).
32
Denzinger, n. 787–792.
33
See Denzinger, n. 180.
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Manoeuvre intends to merely reproduce these claims in order to ground
its claim that there are truths regarding whether I would or would not
cooperate with God’s grace, prior to God’s decision to give me efficacious
grace. Specifically, these claims seem clearly to entail that I would not cooperate with God’s grace absent God’s intervention. Thus, the Manoeuvre
does not require Molinism to be true in order to claim that there are truths
about what I would do in the relevant situation—all that need be true are
these Catholic claims about original sin and grace.
Nevertheless, these claims do not actually help; rather, the Garrigou
Manoeuvre needs more. The Manoeuvre presumes that another Christian
doctrine is true, for the Catholic tradition also claims that God intends to
help all—He desires that all be saved.34 For the Banezian, this is translated
into the claim that God gives every human being sufficient grace to produce a good act, even if they never cooperate with God’s grace to do so.35
Because this is true, the story of sin cannot be complete without making it
clear that a person is culpable of sin only when they are given the opportunity by God to cooperate with His offer of salvation. That is, the relevant
moment for the sinner needs to be subsequent to God’s decision to give
sufficient grace to the sinner, but before we know whether God gives that
sinner efficacious grace or not.
So, the story of sin can be filled in like this: God does not take away or
impede my normally-functioning capacities for choice when I sin, nor does
He take away the power He has given me to avoid sinning, i.e., sufficient grace.
This is because God merely knows that I inevitably will reject His offer of
help, the sufficient grace to avoid sinning, and so that I would always commit
sin without His help (in all, or all relevant, modal worlds36). Then, God is
under no obligation to save me from myself, from what He knows I would do
with that sufficient grace, and so Him leaving me without efficacious grace
does not make Him responsible for my sins. But this is to say that there
are truths about what I would do subsequent to God’s offer of sufficient
grace, but prior to His decision to give efficacious grace or withhold it. And
these truths are not merely truths relevant to Catholic doctrines of grace or
original sin, where it would be inevitable that I commit sin without God’s
help, but in the context of God’s having made an offer of help, i.e., sufficient grace, and so a different context where it is no longer inevitable that
I commit sin.

34
The heresy of Janenism led to a condemnation of the position that not all were given
sufficient grace. In Cum Occasione, the papal bull condemning propositions attributed to
Cornelius Jansen, the following proposition is condemned: “Some of God’s precepts are
impossible to the just, who wish and strive to keep them, according to the present powers
which they have; the grace, by which they are made possible, is also wanting” (Denzinger,
n. 1092).
35
C.f., O’Neil, Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin, 78–81.
36
The qualification involving “modal worlds” is intended to leave the Banezian room to
choose between these claims; it is not a claim that God knows a disjunctive fact.
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Notice that the doctrine of original sin does not claim that I will inevitably sin even after being offered sufficient grace to avoid sin. Instead,
it seems plausible that, if sufficient grace is a power, then, subsequent to
being given sufficient grace, there are possible worlds where I do not sin.
For example, if God chooses to give me efficacious grace as well as sufficient grace, then there is a world where I choose to cooperate with that
sufficient grace and actually avoid sinning, and it is false that I inevitably
sin after being given sufficient grace. The problem is Banezianism by itself
can only support such a claim that God knows that I would inevitably
sin, after being given sufficient grace, with the proviso that, if God did not
grant the creature efficacious grace, we know with certainty that the creature
can do no good and would sin without that efficacious help.37 But that’s
not ultimately to the point. The Manoeuvre needs it to be true, prior to or
independent of whether God has chosen to give me efficacious grace, that
it is always the case that I will inevitably use God’s sufficient grace badly,
in order to argue that God is under no obligation to save me from what
I would have done if God had not intervened. But this is clearly a Molinist
assumption, a counterfactual claim about what I would have done that is
not made true by any decision of God’s about whether to give efficacious
grace or not.
Similarly, then, facts about my acts proceeding from my rational or
volitional capacities are beside the point. Perhaps we might think that
alternative possibilities are not required for freedom. A slide between lack
of alternative possibilities for action and lack of responsibility is not obviously justified, even on a libertarian account of freedom. The theological
counterexample is obvious: God cannot sin, just as the saints in heaven
cannot sin. It is conceivable that both are nevertheless free, even if they
lack alternative possibilities that allow them to sin. Even if I lacked alternative possibilities, it might be the case that we have some theory that, as
long as I was responsible for the possibilities I did have open to me, or was
otherwise the “ultimate cause” of my own acts (on some theory of what
that requires), I can still be acting freely.38 But this kind of theory is irrelevant for the Manoeuvre’s explanation as to how God is not responsible
for sins.
The critical point is that God has to “merely know” that I inevitably
will reject His offer of help to avoid sin, in order to give sense to the claim
that God merely permits that to occur— God is then under no obligation
to save me from my own bad choices. But, if there are only truths about
Notice that my analysis differs from other authors who criticize Garrigou-Lagrange on
this count. E.g., Diem argues that one could only know that I would inevitably sin absent
God’s efficacious grace if human nature were determined to evil (William Diem, “Why not
to be a ‘Thomist,’” 218, esp. 209).
38
Eleonore Stump has argued that, in cases such as those described, one does not need
alternative possibilities to be free (see “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”).
See also Stump, Aquinas, 278. And Aquinas’s claim that God has free will in Summa Theologiae
I, q. 19, a. 10 entails (as in his ad. 2) that the ability to sin is not essential to free will.
37
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what I would do without God’s help subsequent to God making a decision
to withhold efficacious grace, as Banezianism holds, then that my actions
proceed properly from my intellectual or volitional faculties, or that I am
the ultimate cause of my own actions (or whatever such theory we might
hold in place of a requirement that I have alternative possibilities for
action), would not by itself be enough to determine what I would or would
not do in some such situation. We would need further facts about what
God chooses to do, namely, whether God has chosen to give me efficacious grace or not, to say what I would do in these situations. However, the
Manoeuvre is only explanatory if it can pose a clear distinction between
God permitting and causing me to sin. And this apparently requires that
we can know what I would do independent and prior to God’s decision of
whether to give me efficacious grace or not.
c. The Dilemma for the Manoeuvre in a Nutshell
Clearly, Banezianism is not the view that God decides to give efficacious
grace after sufficient grace because of an act of cooperation or rejection that
I perform independent of his decree, which He foresees me performing.
Why then think that the Garrigou Manoeuvre requires that God know
these Molinist-esque counterfactuals? The dilemma is that there is an
instability in the Garrigou Manoeuvre between its explicit account of why
God decides to give efficacious grace, where the view is clear in rejecting
counterfactuals of freedom, and its claims about what grounds attributions
of moral responsibility to the creature, subsequent to God’s decision to
give them efficacious grace.
Garrigou-Lagrange’s version of the story of sin begins in eternity—God
has from all eternity decreed that He permits me to sin, and knows that
I will sin inevitably if He permits it, but has not thereby caused me to
sin: “God foresees the sin and its beginning in His permissive decree . . .
if God wills to permit the evil which He is not bound to prevent, that
real [antecedent] power [to avoid sin] will never be reduced to act. Hence
knowing His permissive decree, God infallibly recognized the deficiency,
though He does not cause it.”39 The idea is not that God first foresees my
sin and then permits it; instead, the logical order is the other way around:
God makes a decision to let me sin and then He foresees my (inevitable)
actual sin. Yet, Garrigou-Lagrange tries to draw a distinction between
causally intervening and refraining from causally intervening. As God is
not affecting my normally-functioning capacities, He recognizes that His
refraining from intervening makes it true that I will sin, before I have done
anything to which God might be responding and without God having
a reason to deny me this intervention. God has not made me sin in any
sense—Garrigou-Lagrange argues—but only permitted me to do so.

39

Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace, 228.
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Consider what happens to the Manoeuvre when we try to remove these
counterfactuals from Garrigou-Lagrange’s explanation. Banezianism
holds that there are no counterfactuals of freedom—God’s causality is precisely what makes it the case that I act a certain way, so that without God’s
decision there are no truths about what I would do. If there are no truths
about what I would do in the event that God gave me merely sufficient
grace (i.e., what I would do under the influence of God’s sufficient grace
logically prior to or independent of God’s decision to give efficacious
grace or withhold it from me) then the whole account of God’s permitting
me to act on my own powers, and so be responsible for my own sinful acts
sans efficacious grace, becomes unintelligible. Similarly, the language of
God not intervening in the normal or ordinary course of my actions seems
to presume that there is some such “course” my actions would take if He
had not intervened.
It seems reasonable to think there need to be some grounds for God to
know that I would do something, prior to and independent of His efficacious grace, in order for the Manoeuvre to be able to make the relevant
distinctions. If I have no possibilities for acting otherwise except logically
subsequent to God’s decision to give efficacious grace to me at some time
(or not), then the Garrigou Manouevre’s story of sin is false. God’s permission for my sin, not giving me efficacious grace, is what makes it true
that I will commit sin, in all such possible worlds, and there is no relevant
distinction between God “causing” and God “permitting” me to sin by
choosing to withhold efficacious grace. Consequently, it would not have
been true that I would have sinned if God had not intervened, because
there were no such truths about what I would have done prior to God
choosing to intervene or not. God’s decision not to give me efficacious
grace is what made it true that I would sin. It then seems fairly clear that
God’s decision is what restricts my alternative possibilities in such a way
that I cannot perform any supernatural act—it is not a moral dilemma
such as those that I might enter by my own poor choices, but a dilemma
that God causes me to be in, a situation where it becomes impossible for
me to fulfill God’s commandments.
But this sets up the dilemma for the view. On one fork, GarrigouLagrange and O’Neil argue that I am responsible for my sins because it
was true that I was going to sin, even prior to and logically independent
of God’s choice not to give me efficacious grace, and so He is under no
obligation to save me from myself. The Garrigou Manoeuvre’s story of
sin would then claim that God merely knows that I will always freely
choose to sin in all worlds where He gives me sufficient grace to avoid
sinning, despite the fact that God had given me sufficient grace so that
I had non-sinful alternative possibilities open to me. But if there are counterfactuals of freedom, such as those concerning what I would do prior to
God’s decision to give me grace, Molinism would be true and Banezianism
false. Thus, on this fork, Banezianism is vindicated as non-compatibilist,
but at the price of holding that there are counterfactuals of freedom—and
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so at the price of making the Manoeuvre inconsistent, because it would
entail the falsity of Banezian claims that there are no counterfactuals of
freedom.
On the other fork, the Banezian needs to rescue the claims about what
I can do, but without appeal to counterfactuals of freedom. We should first
note that the Manoeuvre fails to meet Garrigou-Lagrange and O’Neil’s own
standard that God can only hold me responsible for my sin if there were a
set of relevant alternative possibilities (or, some possible world) such that it
is open to me to avoid sinning. If it were true that there are no counterfactuals of freedom, then God’s decision to withhold efficacious grace from me
is what makes it impossible for me to do anything other than sin, because
God’s decision cuts off all relevant alternative possibilities where I do not
sin. I will inevitably sin, and there are no alternative possibilities open to
me, in all those worlds where God does not give me efficacious grace. But,
by their own apparent account, the facts about my volitional or intellectual faculties, plus God’s sufficient grace given to me, are not enough by
themselves to ground the existence of even one possible world where I can
avoid sin. On this reading, where the Garrigou Manoeuvre would require
alternative possibilities, it would appear flatly false that I can resist God’s
grace insofar as there is no possible world where I do.
As noted, however, there is an extensive contemporary literature,
sparked by Harry Frankfurt, arguing that alternative possibilities are
not required for freedom or moral responsibility.40 I have suggested that
we can make the Manoeuvre more consistent by rejecting (O’Neil and
Garrigou-Lagrange’s own) appeal to alternative possibilities, instead
holding that all we need for freedom or moral responsibility is that free
actions proceed from a creature’s own intellect and will. On this reading,
even though it is true that there are no possible worlds where I do not sin,
logically subsequent to God’s permission of my sin, I am still responsible
for any sins I commit in virtue of having a properly functioning intellect
and will. Unlike the cases envisioned by libertarian deniers of the principle of alternative possibilities, I was arguably not the ultimate cause of
the restricted set of alternative possibilities that I find myself in when God
chooses from eternity to withhold efficacious grace from me.41 When there
40
The literature is voluminous. The debate was begun with Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Peter van Inwagen replied with his, “Ability and
Responsibility.” Later, a significant response to van Inwagen was proposed by John Martin
Fischer, who argued that van Inwagen’s account was not sufficiently robust (Fischer, “Van
Inwagen on Free Will”).
41
Stump, “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: Beyond the Flicker of
Freedom,” op. cit.: “But in all these cases, we can suppose, the agent is the ultimate source
of her action. The ultimate cause of her action is found in her intellect and will; she does
what she does only because of her own beliefs and desires, and there is no other cause of
what she does. She is therefore ultimately responsible for what she does. Nonetheless, it
isn’t necessary for her to have ultimate responsibility that she have alternative possibilities
available to her. Her intellect and will might be such that all options but one are unthinkable
for her” (324).
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are only sinful possibilities open to me, and I would find it unthinkable or
undesirable to do anything but sin, I did not put myself in this position.
Instead, it would appear that God was the one who put me in this position
by choosing to withhold efficacious grace from me from eternity. Even if
my decision proceeded from my intellect and will, the Banezian account
of divine causality appears to undercut the claim that I am the ultimate
source or cause of my decisions.
Consequently, the situation here puts the Garrigou Manoeuvre in the
neighborhood of other kinds of what is called source compatibilism in recent
literature, rather than the libertarian deniers of the alternative possibilities.42 Obviously, the theological compatibilist wing of Banezianism would
embrace this position; even if God restricts my possibilities from eternity,
making it the case that there is no possible world where I avoid sinning,
it is nevertheless true that I am responsible for my acts of sin because
they proceed, e.g., properly from my own faculties (insert here another
preferred account of what is required for responsibility). Unlike typical source compatibilists, the Garrigou Manoeuvre needs to account for
how God’s sufficient grace figures in me having the power to avoid sin,
in addition to my faculties. The Catholic doctrine of grace requires that,
even if my intellect and will function appropriately, I would not have even
been able to desire God’s grace without His grace already working in me.
On this compatibilist reading, then, to say that God is “permitting” me to
sin is meaningful because He has not interfered with the normal function
of my faculties, acting under sufficient grace. The Garrigou Manoeuvre
also goes beyond typical source compatibilism because it requires God’s
efficacious grace to be an instance where God is casually intervening in the
normal operation of those faculties, and where this is compatible with my
freedom. Individuating how God’s intervention is nevertheless part of or
compatible with the proper operation of my own faculties will be tricky.
Those difficulties might not be insuperable, but another is. As noted
earlier, the Banezian compatibilist holds that facts about my will, intellect,
and God’s sufficient grace do not entail that there is any possible world
where I can avoid sin, nor that these things would entail that there is a
possible world where I can resist grace when I am acting under efficacious grace. What, then, could account for me having such a power either
to avoid sinning or to resist God’s efficacious grace? Namely, because
I acted from the right process or faculties, operating under sufficient grace.
42
Among those who have called for a move beyond Frankfurt-style counter-examples to
the “principle of alternate possibilities,” Michael McKenna, for example, has argued that any
kind of freedom compatible with the examples is not robust enough to attribute moral responsibility (“Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative Possibilities”). R. Jay Wallace proposed
an account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, where moral responsibility involves an
agent having capacities for moral understanding and reflective self-control. McKenna, too,
argues that freedom requires being properly responsive to reasons for action, even when
the agent cannot do otherwise, but proposes important modifications on Fischer’s position
(“Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms”).
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However, a typical way for those compatibilists who appeal to a right or
proper process or faculty to individuate the “right” kind of responsiveness
required for freedom is through a modal characterization of such processes
or faculties. Possession of the relevant intellectual and volitional faculties is not enough, for example, for me to be responding to moral reasons
or acting on reasons. A sleeping person has these faculties, but his/her
actions (e.g., falling out of bed) do not properly proceed from those faculties, as the agent was not responding to reasons in so acting. Instead, the
typical construction is that to be responsive to reasons involves sensitivity to those reasons. As McKenna puts it, “Different reasons, understood
as different inputs, would have yielded different outputs, understood as
alterations in modes of conduct. And what this shows is that the agent’s
response to the actual ‘inputs’ played a role that was itself sensitive to, or
responsive to, the actual conditions in which the agent acted.”43
The problem is that the Banezian compatiblist cannot appeal to a modal
characterization of faculties in this way, because there are no possible
worlds where I can avoid sin if God chooses to withhold efficacious grace,
just as there is no possible world where I can resist grace when He decides
to give me efficacious grace. In such cases, I am modally sensitive not to
the reasons for me to act, but rather my acts are sensitive only to God’s
choices. And other compatibilist strategies by appealing to the mechanism
by which I acted—my faculties plus sufficient grace—as reasons-responsive are unhelpful for the same reason: that mechanism is not responsive
to reasons, but is modally sensitive only to God’s choices.44 The compatibilist Banezian might also try to argue that my faculties are like “masked”
or “finked” dispositions, where some extraneous factor prevents the manifestation of the power. For instance, salt has the power to be soluble (say,
on account either of its chemical microstructure or its essence) but this
power will not manifest, i.e., is “masked,” if that salt is encased in wax.45
In the same way, although my faculties plus sufficient grace are such that
I have the ability to avoid sin in virtue of being able to act on these faculties, I can never manifest this power without God’s efficacious grace.46
In all these cases (as with Frankfurt counterexamples), the question
is whether I had the power to have chosen or done differently under
the circumstances, where the relevant circumstances are either prior to
and independent of God’s efficacious grace (in avoiding sin), or subsequent to efficacious grace (in resisting grace).47 In neither case, though,
can the Banezian compatibilist account for why possessing and acting
McKenna, “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanism,” 154.
E.g., John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 38.
45
David Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions”; CB Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals.”
46
My ability to avoid sin is “masked” by the circumstances of God permitting me to sin,
just like my faculty to resist God’s grace is “finked” by God’s causal intervention in efficacious grace.
47
See the discussion in Randolph Clarke, “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will.”
43
44
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on my intellectual/volitional faculties (even elevated by God’s sufficient grace) allows for me to have the power to do otherwise, given
the barren modal landscape. Every possible world under either relevant set of circumstances has only one set of possibilities. So, none
of the options look good for the Banezian compatibilist to defend the
Garrigou Manoeuvre.
d. Conclusion
All that seems left to the compatibilist Banezian is to hold that such
a power to do otherwise is a brute fact, following upon me possessing certain intellectual/volitional capacities and sufficient grace. But
this would be to abandon the Manoeuvre, in essence, because the brutality of the explanation ramifies upwards and undermines its coherence: to say that my power to do otherwise is a brute fact undermines
any ground for distinguishing what it means for God to permit, rather
than cause, me to sin. (Ironically, too, it would mirror the traditional
way that Molinists have sometimes responded to their own grounding
objection.) For this reason, I conclude that the Garrigou Manoeuvre is
hopeless without Molinist counterfactuals of freedom. But is all hopeless for Banez and his disciples, even if hopeless for Garrigou? Not at
all. While I have posed a serious problem for all varieties of Banezian
theories of God’s grace, and even if the Garrigou Manoeuvre fails to
show how Banezianism is not incoherent, there remain alternative possibilities open to Banezians.
Even if it were true that grace is intrinsically efficacious in the way the
Banezian envisions, and that God chooses from eternity to give efficacious graces only to a subset of all creatures, what is needed is some way
that God can be responsive to His creatures, without undermining God’s
causal priority, so that, when God permits His creatures to sin, this need
not doom them to modal worlds where sin is inevitable. The Banezian
cannot appeal to the counterfactuals of freedom proposed by Molinism
as what makes God’s choices about giving efficacious grace responsive
to human freedom. Yet there remains logical space in which the Banezian
might avoid the apparently compatibilist conclusions of their way of
understanding God’s causality. In particular, there is no reason that the
Banezian must be a source compatibilist, even if they are driven to deny
the principle of alternative possibilities. It is often assumed that God’s
sovereignty over free will, on the Banezian theory of divine causality,
requires that God is totally unresponsive to creaturely freedom. Yet, if
the Banezian can appeal to how God makes a choice to give efficacious
grace as accounting for the way in which a creature retains the ability to
resist God’s grace or avoid sin, there are potential routes for resolving the
uniquely Banezian grounding problem. But I will leave that exploration
for a future paper.
Hong Kong Baptist University

BANEZ’S BIG PROBLEM: THE GROUND OF FREEDOM

111

References
Anfray, Jean-Pascal. 2014. “Molina and John Duns Scotus.” In Companion to Luis
de Molina, edited by Matthis Kaufmann & Alexander Aichele (Brill), 325–364.
Clarke, Randolph. 2009. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will.” Mind 118:
323–351.
Cowan, Steven B. 2003. “The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge
Revisited.” Religious Studies 39: 93–102. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003
4412502006352
Craig, William. 2001. “Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the ‘Grounding
Objection.’” Faith and Philosophy 18: 337–352. https://doi.org/10.5840/
faithphil200118329
Davies, Brian. 2006. The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (Continuum).
Davison, Scott A. 2004. “Craig on the Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge.”
Faith and Philosophy 21: 365–369. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil200421333
Denzinger, Heinrich; Peter Hünermann; et al., eds. 1954. Sources of Catholic Dogma,
30th edition. Translated by Roy Deferrari Fitzwilliam (Loretto Publications).
Diem, William. 2020. “Why not to be a ‘Thomist.’” International Journal of Systematic
Theology 22: 191–218.
Fischer, John Martin. 1986. “Van Inwagen on Free Will.” Philosophical Quarterly 36:
252–260. https://doi.org/10.2307/2219772
Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control (Cambridge
University Press).
Flint, Thomas. 1998. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Cornell University
Press).
Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” The
Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. 1939. Predestination. Translated by Bede Rose (B.
Herder Book Co.).
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. 1952. Grace: Commentary on the Summa Theologica of
St. Thomas Aquinas IaIIae, q. 109–14. Translated by Dominican Nuns (Herder).
Grant, W. Matthews. 2009. “Aquinas on How God Causes the Act of Sin without
Causing Sin Itself.” Thomist 73: 455–496. https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.2009.0015
Grant, W. Matthews. 2010. “Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Free Acts are
Caused by God?” Faith and Philosophy 27: 22–44. https://doi.org/10.5840
/faithphil20102712
Koons, Robert. 2002. “Dual Agency: A Thomistic Account of Providence and
Human Freedom.” Philosophia Christi 4: 397–410. https://doi.org/10.5840
/pc20024241
Lewis, David. 1997. “Finkish Dispositions.” Philosophical Quarterly 47: 143–158.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00052
Lonergan, Bernard. 2000. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of
St. Thomas Aquinas (University of Toronto Press).
Long, Steven. 2010. Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace
(Fordham University Press).
Long, Steven. 2018. “St. Thomas Aquinas, Divine Causality, and the Mystery
of Predestination.” In Thomism and Predestination: Principles and Disputations,
edited by Steven A. Long, Roger W. Nutt, and Thomas Joseph White (Sapientia
Press), 51–76.

112

Faith and Philosophy

Loughran, Thomas J. 1999. “Aquinas, Compatibilist.” In Human and Divine Agency:
Anglican, Catholic, and Lutheran Perspectives, edited by F. Michael McLain and
W. MarkRichardson (University Press of America), 1–39.
MacDonald, Scott. 1998. “Aquinas’s Libertarian Account of Free Choice.” Revue
Internationale de Philosophie 52: 309–328.
Martin, CB. 1994. “Dispositions and Conditionals.” Philosophical Quarterly 44: 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2220143
McKenna, Michael. 2008. “Frankfurt’s Argument against Alternative
Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples.” Noûs 42: 770–793. https://doi
.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.00701.x
McKenna, Michael. 2013. “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms.” In
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, edited by David Shoemaker (Oxford
UniversityPress), 151–184.
O’Neil, Taylor Patrick. 2019. Grace, Predestination, and the Permission of Sin:
A Thomistic Analysis (Catholic University of America Press).
Osborne, Jr., Thomas M. 2006. “Thomist Premotion and Contemporary Philosophy
of Religion.” Nova et Vetera 4: 607–632.
Rooney, James Dominic. 2020. “Why All Classical Theists Should Believe in Physical
Premotions, But It Doesn’t Really Matter (For Freedom).” In International
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88: 139–166. https://doi.org/10.1007
/s11153-020-09745-z
Rota, Michael. 2015. “Synchronic Contingency and the Problem of Freedom
and Foreknowledge.” Faith and Philosophy 32: 81–96. https://doi.org/10.5840
/faithphil201531630
Shanley, Brian. 2007. “Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism.” In Freedom and
the Human Person, edited by Richard Velkley (Catholic University of America
Press).
Spencer, Mark. 2016. “Divine Causality and Created Freedom.” Nova et Vetera 14:
919–963.
Stump, Eleonore. 1999. “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The
Flicker of Freedom.” The Journal of Ethics 3: 299–324.
Stump, Eleonore. 2003. Aquinas (Routledge).
Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann. 1981. “Eternity.” The Journal of Philosophy
78: 429–458. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026047
Torrijos-Castrillejo, David. 2020. “Was Báñez a Bañecian?” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 94: 431–458. https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020943204
van Inwagen, Peter. 1978. “Ability and Responsibility.” The Philosophical Review 87:
201–224. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184752
Wallace, R. Jay. 1998. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard University
Press).

